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1 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici are constitutional law scholars who 
possess an acute interest in a reasoned development 
of constitutional doctrine.  
A full list of amici is provided as an Appendix 
to this brief.  
 
 
                                                          
1 Counsel for all parties have submitted blanket consent to 
the filing of amicus briefs in this case.  No counsel for a party 
authored this brief in whole or in part.  No person or entity 
other than amici curiae or their counsel made a monetary 
contribution that was intended to fund preparing or submitting 
this brief. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 “[I]n a complex society and an era of pervasive 
governmental regulation, defining the proper realm 
for free exercise can be difficult.”  Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781, 2785 (2014) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”)2 addresses that difficulty 
by harmonizing religious freedom and the interests 
of third parties.  RFRA will not exempt free exercise 
from a law’s command simply because the law 
substantially burdens religion—nor will it deny a 
religious exemption simply because the exemption 
would affect a third party.   
 However, some seek to supplant RFRA’s 
framework with a novel, one-sided constitutional 
doctrine that downplays a law’s burden on religion.  
Several scholars contend that the Establishment 
Clause bans religious exemptions that “require[] 
people to bear the burden of religions to which they 
do not belong and whose teachings they do not 
practice.”3  In this case, these scholars argue, a 
                                                          
2 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488-89; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb 
(Supp. V. 1993). 
3 See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Exemptions from the 
‘Contraception Mandate’ Threaten Religious Liberty, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 15, 2014),   
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/exemptions-from-the-
contraception-mandate-threaten-religious-
liberty/2014/01/15/f5cb9bd0-7d79-11e3-93c1-
0e888170b723_story.html; see also Micah Schwartzman, 
Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, Holt v. Hobbs and Third 
Party Harms, BALKINIZATION BLOG (Jan. 22, 2015), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/01/holt-v-hobbs-and-third-
party-harms.html; Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van 
Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An 
Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
RFRA exemption would substantially burden the 
right of women to “seamless” coverage of 
abortifacients and contraceptives and therefore is 
constitutionally invalid.  These contentions are 
misplaced.      
 RFRA incorporates Establishment Clause 
limits on religious accommodations:  it applies 
equally to all religions and takes into account the 
government’s interest in protecting third parties 
when that interest is compelling.4  There is no 
support in constitutional doctrine or theory for an 
Establishment Clause limit on religious exemptions 
that do not conflict with a government interest that 
is less than compelling.  Rather, the Court has 
consistently held that there is “play in the joints” 
between the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause allowing for legislative action.  
See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713, 719-
20 (2005) (per Ginsburg, J.) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); Hobbie v. Unemployment 
Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987) (“This 
Court has long recognized that the government may 
(and sometimes must) accommodate religious 
practices and that it may do so without violating the 
Establishment Clause.”).  The suggestion that the 
Establishment Clause prevents RFRA from 
                                                                                                                       
C.L. L. REV. 343 (2014); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew 
Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby 
Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANC 51 (2014). 
4 This case does not present an Establishment Clause concern 
over RFRA’s protection of religious exercise.  Even if it did, the 
proper remedy under that Clause is to extend exemptions to 
religious-like objections.  See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 
333, 351-61 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result).  
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operating according to its own terms lacks any 
support in the Court’s cases addressing the Religion 
Clauses.   
 Indeed, the Court has left no doubt that RFRA 
falls within the constitutional “space for legislative 
action [that is] neither compelled by the Free 
Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment 
Clause,” see Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719.  See Hobby 
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (“It is certainly true 
that in applying RFRA ‘courts must take adequate 
account of the burdens a requested accommodation 
may impose on nonbeneficiaries.’  That consideration 
will often inform the analysis of the Government’s 
compelling interest and the availability of a less 
restrictive means of advancing that interest.”) 
(quoting Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720).   The scholars’ 
argument thus conflicts with the Court’s repeated 
application of RFRA,5 with the government’s own 
argument in Hobby Lobby,6 and even with Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent in Hobby Lobby.7  RFRA’s 
                                                          
5 See Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006) (“We reaffirm[] . . . the 
feasibility of case-by-case consideration of religious exemptions 
to generally applicable rules.”).  
6 See Oral Arg. Tr. at 43:3-7, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., No. 13-354 (Mar. 25, 2014) (Justice Alito:  “Well, is it your 
argument that providing the accommodation that’s requested 
here would violate the Establishment Clause?”  General 
Verrilli:  “It’s not our argument that it would violate the 
Establishment Clause.”).   
7 See, e.g., 134 S. Ct. at 2802 n.25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(quoting United States v. Lee, which is not an Establishment 
Clause case, to say that “one person’s right to free exercise must 
be kept in harmony with the rights of her fellow citizens, and 
‘some religious practices [must] yield to the common good.’”) 
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982)). 
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compelling interest test has been shown to be fully 
constitutional.  
 Imposing the Establishment Clause as an 
extraneous limit on exemptions under RFRA would 
upend thousands of religious-exemption statutes.  
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (“By 
framing any Government regulation as benefiting a 
third party, the Government could turn all 
regulations into entitlements to which nobody could 
object on religious grounds . . . .”).  Not even statutes 
that allow individuals and entities absolute 
protection from being forced to provide or pay for 
abortions would be exempt from its sweep.  
 There is at least one reason why some scholars 
may prefer a new constitutional test that considers 
“substantial” third-party harms outside of the RFRA 
analysis: “Seamless” coverage of abortifacients and 
contraceptives is not a compelling government 
interest that can justify denying an exemption to the 
Little Sisters of the Poor and other religious 
nonprofits.  This new test would change the 
“baseline” of rights and make RFRA the problem.  
But, this Court’s jurisprudence requires 
understanding RFRA as preserving the rights of 
religious claimants and third parties as they were 
before the Affordable Care Act burdened religion.   
Congress’ and the Department of Health and Human 
Services’ (“HHS”) own practice reveals the wisdom of 
the Court’s jurisprudence over the new “baseline” 
offered by some scholars.  
 “RFRA is inconsistent with the insistence of 
an agency such as HHS on distinguishing between 
different religious believers—burdening one while 
accommodating the other—when it may treat both 
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equally . . . .” Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
The Affordable Care Act exempted tens-of-millions of 
Americans from “seamless” coverage of abortifacients 
and contraceptives when it excluded “grandfathered” 
plans and small businesses from its reach.  HHS 
then exempted many more Americans when it 
excluded churches and their integrated auxiliaries 
from the coverage mandate.  By the Affordable Care 
Act’s own terms and HHS’ own determination, 
“seamless” coverage of abortifacients and 
contraceptives is to be unavailable to many 
Americans.  The government’s underinclusiveness 
belies the claim that “seamless” coverage is now a 
compelling interest because the Little Sisters of the 
Poor seek the same exemption already given to 
churches and their integrated auxiliaries.    
 Moreover, the abortion context reveals that an 
interest in “seamless” access—even “seamless” access 
to a right deemed by this Court to be protected by 
the Constitution—is not sufficient to justify a 
substantial religious burden.  More broadly, if there 
is a compelling interest in ensuring “seamless” 
health-insurance coverage of important services, it is 
hardly unique to women seeking coverage of 
abortifacients and contraceptives.  But the 
government is not pursuing that interest elsewhere.  
There can thus be no entitlement to “seamless” 
access.      
  Congress could have exempted the Affordable 
Care Act from the application of RFRA.  It did not.  
Instead, RFRA is incorporated within it, meaning 
that no benefit the Affordable Care Act provides can 
be contemplated as standing without RFRA and its 
“stringent test.”  See Hobby Lobby,  134 S. Ct. at 
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2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  “One may not like the 
compelling interest test, but there it is in black and 
white.”  Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs 
Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 
MONT. L. REV. 249, 251 (1995) (emphasis in original).  
“Seamless” coverage cannot satisfy that test, and 
there is no Establishment Clause bypass around it.  
RFRA’s framework structures the difficult harmony 
of interests that is critical to the dignity of the people 
involved and our national identity.  It cannot and 
should not be circumvented.    
ARGUMENT 
I. RFRA HARMONIZES RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM AND THIRD-PARTY 
INTERESTS. 
 “[A] society that believes in the negative 
protection accorded to religious belief can be 
expected to be solicitous of that value in its 
legislation . . . .”  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
890 (1990).  When Congress enacted RFRA in light of 
the Court’s decision in Smith, it manifested 
“solicitousness” towards the social value of religious 
exercise and respected the role of the political 
process in harmonizing religious exemptions with 
other social values.  See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, 
Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of 
Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39, 44-45 (2014); 
William K. Kelley, The Primacy of Political Actors in 
Accommodation of Religion, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 403 
(2000).  RFRA followed from this nation’s long 
tradition of preserving free exercise through 
politically-enacted exemptions.  Indeed, while some 
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framers debated whether they were constitutionally 
compelled, “there is virtually no evidence that 
anyone thought [regulatory exemptions] were 
constitutionally prohibited or that they were part of 
an establishment of religion.”  Douglas Laycock, 
Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the 
Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1796 (2006) (emphasis 
in original).  The harmony RFRA achieved between 
the right of free exercise and other compelling 
interests is apparent throughout its structure.  
 RFRA is at once both sweeping and reserved.  
It supersedes all prior, inconsistent federal law,8 
presumptively applies to all future federal law,9 and 
applies to federal law’s implementation.10  But, if 
Congress does not want RFRA to apply to a given 
statute (perhaps out of a concern for third parties), it 
can simply exempt the statute from RFRA.11  RFRA 
generally prohibits the government from 
“substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability,” but the government may still 
do so when its law, “appli[ed] . . . to the person (1) is 
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering 
that compelling governmental interest.”12  RFRA 
                                                          
8 Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(a), 107 Stat. at 1489; 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb-3(a) (Supp. V. 1993).  
9 Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(b), 107 Stat. at 1489; 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb-3(b) (Supp. V. 1993).   
10 Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(a), 107 Stat. at 1489; 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb-3(a) (Supp. V. 1993). 
11 See supra note 9.   
12 Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3(a) & (b), 107 Stat. at 1488-89; 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb(b), § 2000bb-1(a) & (b) (Supp. V. 1993).  Even 
as RFRA employs “strict scrutiny”—the most demanding 
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calls for a harmonizing of other interests with 
religious exercise, and the exemptions it requires do 
not violate the Establishment Clause.  See O Centro, 
546 U.S. at 436; Michael W. McConnell, 
Accommodation of Religion: An Update and A 
Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 
698 (1992). 
 Indeed, even the scholars urging a ban on 
religious exemptions that accompany “substantial” 
third-party harms concede that “RFRA seems 
facially to comply with the Establishment Clause . . . 
.”13  These scholars contend that RFRA’s “permissive 
accommodations” which “impose significant burdens 
on third parties who do not believe or participate in 
the accommodated practice” violate the 
Establishment Clause.14  But this view presumes 
that RFRA’s consideration of  third-party harms is 
inadequate and that resort to the Establishment 
Clause is required.  The Court has rejected these 
premises.   
 Hobby Lobby confirmed that RFRA calls for 
considering third-party harms within its analysis of 
                                                                                                                       
standard in constitutional law—when evaluating the 
government’s interest in burdening free exercise, the 
government prevails more often than not in religious-exemption 
cases.  See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: 
An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 
59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 861-62 (2006) (concluding that, with 74% 
of religious exemption claims being rejected in the sample, 
“there is a major difference between strict scrutiny’s deadliness 
as applied in exemption cases compared to discrimination 
cases.”). 
13 Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 3, at 348 (emphasis in 
original).  
14 Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 3, at 349. 
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a compelling government interest being pursued 
through the least-restrictive means.  See 134 S. Ct. 
at 2781 n.37; see also Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 
863 (2015) (explaining that the Court will 
“scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of granting specific 
exemptions to particular religious claimants” when 
assessing a compelling interest) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  This makes sense:  
“Indeed, one might simply say that compelling state 
interests just exactly are third party interests of 
adequate gravity.  Whose interests is the government 
protecting in resisting a religious accommodation if 
not those of third parties?”15  RFRA’s own framework 
thus starts with—and depends upon—considering 
third-party interests.  For that reason, the Court has 
not found it necessary to resort to the Establishment 
Clause when considering RFRA claims.  
 In Cutter, the Court confirmed that RFRA’s 
framework responds appropriately to Establishment 
                                                          
15 Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise By Moonlight 24 (St. 
John’s Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
15-2587216, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2587216 (emphasis 
in original).  Considering third-party harms as a facet of a 
compelling-government-interest analysis is commonplace in 
constitutional law.  See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (explaining that the 
“fundamental object” of banning race discrimination in public 
accommodations “was to vindicate the deprivation of personal 
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to 
public establishments.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623, 
625 (1984) (explaining that the compelling government interest 
in “eradicating discrimination against its female citizens” exists 
because sex discrimination “both deprives persons of their 
individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide 
participation in political, economic, and cultural life.”).   
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Clause concerns over religious exemptions.  The 
Court explained that the Religious Land Use 
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA,” which 
possesses the same statutory framework of RFRA) 
raises no Establishment Clause issue.  The Court 
identified three Establishment Clause problems that 
religious exemptions could cause:  (1) an unyielding 
preference for religion; (2) denominational 
favoritism; and (3) inadequate consideration of third-
party harms.  See 544 U.S. at 719-20.  These 
concerns do not mean, as the Court reaffirmed, that 
there is no “space for legislative action [that is] 
neither compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor 
prohibited by the Establishment Clause.”  Id. at 719.  
Rather, the statute’s application must account for 
the Establishment Clause’s requirements.  RFRA 
does just that. 
 First, RFRA avoids creating an unyielding 
religious preference by relieving “exceptional 
government-created burdens on private religious 
exercise.”  Id. at 720.  RFRA assesses the 
“substantial[ity]” of those burdens and the sincerity 
of religious belief case-by-case.  See United States v. 
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944).  Second, RFRA 
avoids denominational favoritism by applying to all 
laws that substantially burden any religion’s 
exercise.  See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720; cf. Bd. of Ed. of 
Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 
(1994) (invalidating a New York school district 
created for a religious denomination).  Third, RFRA 
“take[s] adequate account of the burdens a requested 
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.”  
See 544 U.S. at 720.  Rather than provide an 
“absolute and unqualified [statutory] right” to free 
exercise, see id. at 722, RFRA’s framework requires 
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courts to decide exemption claims case-by-case, 
considering whether substantial burdens on religious 
exercise may persist in light of a compelling 
government interest pursued in the least-restrictive 
way.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37;  cf. 
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722-23 (“We have no cause to 
believe that RLUIPA would not be applied in an 
appropriately balanced way . . . .”). 
 RFRA’s framework stands in stark contrast to 
the religious preferences that the Court has found to 
violate the Establishment Clause.  See, e.g., Estate of 
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1985) 
(holding that a statute allowing Sabbath observers to 
not work on any day they designate as their Sabbath 
provides “unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath 
observers over all other interests”) (emphasis added);  
cf. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 337 n.15 (1987) (“This is a very different 
case than [Caldor] . . . . In effect, Connecticut [in 
Caldor] had given the force of law to the employee’s 
designation of a Sabbath day and required 
accommodation by the employer regardless of the 
burden which that constituted for the employer or 
other employees.”).  Similarly, in Texas Monthly v. 
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion), the 
Court invalidated a law exempting religious 
literature from the state’s sales tax.  Though the 
justices could not agree on the basis for the law’s 
unconstitutionality, RFRA has none of the problems 
identified by members of the Court:  a violation of 
the freedom of the press, see id. at 26 (White, J.); 
lending the government’s support to “the 
communication of religious messages,”  see id. at 28 
(Blackmun, J.); or failing to lift a substantial burden 
on religion or incorporate compelling government 
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interests into the analysis, see id. at 18 n.8 (Brennan, 
J.).   
 Put simply, a proper application of RFRA 
cannot violate the Establishment Clause.  Failing to 
consider the government’s compelling interests—
including avoiding certain third-party harms—would  
violate RFRA, regardless of the Establishment 
Clause.  The harmony RFRA crafted between “the 
exercise of religion” and “other important values in 
life” deserves affirmation by the Court.  See 
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 60 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. at 704.  An alternative view—one that 
places “substantial” third-party harms above and 
beyond RFRA’s framework—“could turn all 
regulations into entitlements to which nobody could 
object on religious grounds . . . .”  Hobby Lobby, 134 
S. Ct. at 2781 n.37.  This view “could not reasonably 
be maintained” in the face of the Court’s 
jurisprudence or this country’s legislative practice.  
See id.  
II. THERE IS NO BASIS TO CONCLUDE 
THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF 
“SUBSTANTIAL” THIRD-PARTY 
HARMS PRECLUDES RELIGIOUS 
EXEMPTIONS. 
 The Court has not allowed the possibility of 
substantial third-party harms to trump religious 
exemptions. Indeed, the Court has so held with 
unanimity. 
 Hosanna-Tabor held that the First 
Amendment’s “ministerial exception” to federal anti-
discrimination statutes barred a retaliation claim 
from an ordained teacher at a Lutheran school.  
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Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 
School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).  The case 
rested on both the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause, see, e.g., id. at 699, but neither 
Clause was understood to thwart the right to church 
autonomy because of a possible harm to third 
parties.16 
 There is no doubt that a third-party harm was 
at stake in Hosanna-Tabor:  The only reason why the 
employee in the case could not sue her employer for 
violating the Americans With Disabilities Act’s 
retaliation prohibition was that the employer was a 
religious organization.  The means of protecting the 
third-party interest in that case without recognizing 
the ministerial exception—evaluating the application 
of employment-discrimination laws against religious 
organizations case-by-case—would result in illegal 
government interference with a church’s governance.  
See id. at 706. 
 “The interest of society in the enforcement of 
employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly 
important.  But so too is the interest of religious 
                                                          
16 It is logical for the two religion clauses to work in tandem 
here.  As the Court has recognized, there are contexts in which 
the Free Exercise Clause compels religious exemptions—even 
when doing so harms third parties.  See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 
144-45 (“This Court has long recognized that the government 
may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices 
and that it may do so without violating the Establishment 
Clause.”).  Arguing that the Establishment Clause bars 
religious exemptions simply because they harm third parties 
would, as Professor Michael McConnell has explained, 
“[p]aradoxically” eviscerate the Free Exercise Clause.  See 
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
at 691.  
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groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, 
teach their faith, and carry out their mission.”17  Id. 
at 710.  Giving heed to both religious freedom and 
third-party harms in constitutional cases like 
Hosanna-Tabor is consistent with both RFRA’s 
statutory framework and the Court’s practice under 
other statutes.18  
 The Court has upheld statutory religious 
exemptions even when the third-party interest 
emanates from a statute, as is the case here.  In 
Amos, the Court rejected an as-applied 
Establishment Clause challenge to Title VII’s 
exemption of religious employers from its prohibition 
on religious discrimination.  See 483 U.S. at 329-30. 
This exemption allowed a religious employer to 
terminate a building custodian based on his 
religion—a clear third-party harm that the Court 
found insufficient to block the statutory exemption.19  
The Court upheld the exemption because its purpose 
was to “lift[] a regulation [Title VII] that burdens the 
                                                          
17 Even Hosanna-Tabor’s caveat—“express[ing] no view on 
whether the [ministerial] exception bars other types of suits”—
undermines the view that religious exemptions must fail when 
they raise substantial third-party harms. See id.  By reserving 
judgment on “the applicability of the exception to other 
circumstances,” id., the Court embraced the same kind of case-
by-case analysis of religious burdens and third-party harms 
that RFRA embodies. 
18 Additionally, the principle that substantial third-party harms 
will not thwart the exercise of constitutionally-guaranteed 
rights is no stranger to other First Amendment guarantees.  
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); New York Times 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
19 Title VII was amended in 1972 so as to extend this religious 
“exemption to all activities of religious organizations,” allowing 
it to reach even a religious organization’s building custodians.  
See id. at 332 n.9.  
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exercise of religion.”  Id. at 338.  As Amos explained, 
this purpose is distinct from an impermissible 
advancement of religion.  Unlike statutes that 
“delegate[] governmental power to religious 
employers and convey[] a message of governmental 
endorsement of religious discrimination,” id. at 337 
n.15, this exemption simply “lifted” a governmental 
burden on religion—returning the rights of the 
religious employer and the employee to the pre-
burden “baseline.”  RFRA provides the same 
“baseline” here. 
  Just as in Amos, RFRA does not call for 
religious exemptions that impermissibly advance 
religion.  As explained above, RFRA’s construction 
and framework eschew outcomes prohibited by the 
Establishment Clause.  Instead, as Amos teaches, 
the HHS mandate cannot be considered without the 
Affordable Care Act’s incorporation of RFRA—just as 
Title VII’s religious discrimination ban could not be 
considered without its exemption for religious 
employers.  By its own terms, RFRA applies to any 
subsequent federal statute unless the statute 
expressly says otherwise,20 and RFRA applies to that 
statute’s implementation as well.21  Because 
Congress did not specifically exempt the Affordable 
Care Act from RFRA, RFRA is part of that Act and 
its implementation.  This construction is meant to 
ensure that the “baseline” contemplates religious 
exemptions.   
                                                          
20 Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(b), 107 Stat. at 1489; 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb-3(b) (Supp. V. 1993).   
21 Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(a), 107 Stat. at 1489; 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb-3(a) (Supp. V. 1993). 
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 Like in Amos, the HHS mandate disrupts the 
status quo by forcing religious nonprofits to provide a 
benefit which imposes a religious burden—one 
recognized by HHS when raised by churches and 
their integrated auxiliaries and by the Court in the 
context of for-profit corporations.  To determine 
whether the exemption added to Title VII to “lift” 
this religious burden violated the Establishment 
Clause as an impermissible advancement of religion, 
Amos assessed whether “the Church’s ability to 
propagate its religious doctrine . . .  is any greater 
now than it was prior to the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.”  See 483 U.S. at 337.  It was 
not—the statutory exemption simply returned the 
religious organization’s (and the individual’s rights) 
to a proverbial neutral: no new burden on religion or 
new benefit to employee.  RFRA has the same effect: 
A religious exemption in its name simply “lifts” the 
burden imposed on religious employers by the 
Affordable Care Act, returning both the religious 
employer and its employees to neutral.  That 
“baseline” does not generate a “substantial” third-
party harm that the government has a compelling 
interest in preventing.  
 Amos teaches that the distinction between a 
religious exemption that lifts a government-imposed 
burden on religion and a statutory religious 
preference is critical to understanding the proper 
“baseline.”  The statute at issue in Amos, like RFRA 
here, are “shield[s] from . . .  general regulatory 
burden[s] imposed by the state, [not] . . . sword[s] 
forcing others in the private sector to facilitate [the 
claimant’s] religious practices . . . .”  See Carl H. 
Esbeck, Third-Party Harms, Congressional Statutes 
Accommodating Religion, and the Establishment 
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Clause 8 (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, No. 2015-10, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2607277.  This distinction 
puts the case here (like Amos) in contrast with 
instances where the Court has found statutes 
benefiting religious claimants unconstitutional.  See, 
e.g., Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 n.15 (distinguishing 
Caldor on the grounds that “[u]ndoubtedly, [the third 
party’s] freedom of choice in religious matters was 
impinged upon, but it was the Church . . . and not 
the Government who put him to the choice of 
changing his religious practices or losing his job. . . 
.”); see also Esbeck, Third-Party Harms, at 8 (“Unlike 
Caldor’s naked preference [for religion] where the 
statute had government intervening in a private-
sector dispute on the side of religion, in Amos 
Congress did not vest religious employers with new 
powers but left them with the same net powers as it 
had before the passage of Title VII.”).   
 The distinction between a religious exemption 
and a statutory religious preference also corrects the 
scholars’ understanding of the Court’s decision in 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 
(1977) (“TWA”).  The scholars suggest that this case 
allows religious exemptions to fail in the face of a de 
minimis third-party harm.  But, this conclusion 
ignores that TWA was a religious-preference case.   
 The statutory provision at issue in TWA was 
Title VII’s requirement that employers accommodate 
their employees’ (and prospective employees’) 
religious needs.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).  Unlike the 
statute in Caldor, which afforded an “unyielding” 
religious preference, this statute allowed the 
employer to refuse religious accommodations that 
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imposed an “undue hardship” on it.  In defining 
“undue hardship” to be only a “de minimis cost,” see 
432 U.S. at 84, the Court does not mean that such 
costs defeat religious exemptions.  Unlike Amos or 
this case, TWA did not present a general 
governmental burden on religious exercise that a 
religious claimant could seek statutory relief from.  
By defining “undue hardship” to be nothing more 
than a de minimis cost, the Court avoided an 
Establishment Clause problem akin to the 
“unyielding” preference in Caldor.  Cf. 432 U.S. at 89 
(Marshall, J. dissenting) (“The Court’s interpretation 
of the statute, by effectively nullifying it, has the 
singular advantage of making consideration of 
[TWA’s] constitutional challenge unnecessary.”).  But 
Establishment Clause concerns about “unyielding” 
statutory preferences for religion are irrelevant to the 
“baseline” provided by religious exemptions from 
governmental burdens.   
 The scholars advocating for a ban on RFRA 
exemptions from the Affordable Care Act fail to 
appreciate RFRA’s rule of construction and Amos.  
These scholars assert that “[a]ny argument about 
impermissible cost shifting [between the religious 
claimant’s interest and the third-party’s alleged 
harm] must identify the proper status quo ante as 
the baseline measure of whether and to what extent 
costs have been shifted.”22  To them, this entails that 
the “baseline” between the religious objector and the 
third party should be set before RFRA was passed in 
199323 or that it should assume the universal 
availability of health-insurance coverage for 
                                                          
22 Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 3, at 371.  
23 Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 3, at 371. 
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contraceptives and abortifacients.24  The net effect is 
to make RFRA exemptions a disruption to the status 
quo, resulting in an impermissible cost-shifting to 
third parties that implicates the Establishment 
Clause.  This argument—in addition to being 
contrary to  Amos—proves too much: It would 
undermine this nation’s long and rich history of 
statutory exemptions for religion. 
  Indeed, in the context of “lifting a regulation” 
that burdens free exercise, see Amos, 483 U.S. at 
337-38, the Court has upheld statutory religious 
exemptions that facially involve third-party harm.  
These exemptions simply restore the “baseline” of 
rights to their pre-religious-burden state—they do 
not advance religion.  The fact that this has the net 
effect of removing a burden on religion while denying 
a potential benefit to a third party is immaterial.  As 
the Court said in Amos, “[w]here . . . government acts 
with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that 
burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to 
require that the exemption come packaged with 
benefits to secular entities.”  483 U.S. at 337-38; see 
also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (“Nothing 
in the text of RFRA or its basic purposes supports 
giving the Government an entirely free hand to 
impose burdens on religious exercise so long as those 
burdens confer a benefit on other individuals.”).     
 170,000 Vietnam War draftees received 
conscientious-objector deferments, see James W. 
                                                          
24 See Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, 
Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part II: What 
Counts As A Burden on Employees?,  BALKINIZATION, (Dec. 4, 
2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-and-
establishment-clause.html.  
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Tollefson, THE STRENGTH NOT TO FIGHT: AN ORAL 
HISTORY OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS OF THE 
VIETNAM WAR 7 (1993), even as the selective service 
exemption for these objectors was facially limited to 
those with a belief in a “Supreme Being” and the 
granting of an objection sent a third party to war in 
the objector’s place.  See Gillette v. United States, 401 
U.S. 437 (1971) (upholding the Military Selective 
Service Act); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 
333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 
(1965). Generous wartime religious exemptions date 
back to the Revolutionary War and the Quakers and 
occurred even in the course of world wars.  See, e.g., 
The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) 
(finding no Establishment Clause violation in 
military draft exemptions for clergy members, 
seminarians, and pacifists).   
 Further, “[a]ll fifty states have enacted 
statutes granting some form of testimonial privilege 
to clergy-communicant communications.  Neither 
scholars nor courts question the legitimacy of the 
privilege, and attorneys rarely litigate the issue,” 
even as the privilege—rooted in religious exercise—
imposes an obstacle to a third-party’s search for 
truth.  Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1532 
(9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).   
 Moreover, “the abortion context offers the 
most systematic and all-encompassing example of 
government efforts to ensure that unwilling 
individuals”—often individuals with religious 
objections to abortion—“are not forced to engage in 
what they believe to be killings.”  Mark L. Rienzi, 
The Constitutional Right Not To Kill, 62 EMORY L.J. 
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121, 147 (2012).  This particular context is quite 
analogous to the RFRA exemption sought by the 
Little Sisters of the Poor and other religious 
nonprofits here, as these exemptions can result in 
the lack of “seamless” access to government-funded 
abortion.  Nevertheless, “[c]oncern about 
discrimination against individuals who, for religious 
or other moral reasons, objected to participating in 
providing abortion services led to the widespread 
adoption of conscience clause statutes.”  Lynn D. 
Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health 
Care Providers, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 177, 180-81 (1993); 
see also Rienzi, The Constitutional Right Not To Kill, 
62 EMORY L.J. at 148-49 (citing illustrative 
“conscience clause” provisions and concluding that 
“virtually every state in the country has some sort of 
statute protecting individuals and, in many cases, 
entities who refuse to provide abortions”).   
 The story is the same at the federal level.  The 
“Church Amendment,” which ensured that recipients 
of particular federal funds were not obliged to 
provide abortions and could not discriminate against 
employees who would not participate in abortions, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(1) (2006), passed 
overwhelmingly and became law in 1973.  In 
advocating for the Amendment, Senator Ted 
Kennedy explained that “Congress has the authority 
under the Constitution to exempt individuals from 
any requirement that they perform medical 
procedures that are objectionable to their religious 
convictions.”  119 CONG. REC. 9602 (1973) (emphasis 
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added).  The same sentiment followed for future 
federal conscience protections.25  
  The lack of “seamless” access to abortion 
generated by these exemptions does not constitute a 
third-party harm under the Court’s cases, even as a 
compelling interest in protecting the right to 
abortion exists in the Court’s cases.  Indeed, in the 
passage of RFRA, some of its advocates made clear 
that RFRA would draw this exact distinction.  See, 
e.g., The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act:  Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 192 (1992) (statement of 
Nadine Strossen) (explaining that “[i]n the aftermath 
of the Smith decision, it was easy to imagine how 
religious practices and institutions would have to 
abandon their beliefs in order to comply with 
generally applicable, neutral laws. . . . At risk were 
such familiar practices as . . . permitting religiously 
sponsored hospitals to decline to provide abortion or 
contraception services . . . .”);  139 CONG. REC. 9685 
(1993) (statement of Rep. Hoyer) (explaining that 
RFRA is “an opportunity to correct . . . injustice[s]” 
like a “Catholic teaching hospital [that] lost its 
accreditation for refusing to provide abortion 
services”).  To argue otherwise is to invite the Court 
to question all of these statutory exemptions with a 
                                                          
25 These protections include the Danforth Amendment,  
extending the refusal to participate in abortion or abortion-
related services beyond religious objections, see 42 U.S.C. § 
238n, and the Hyde-Weldon Amendment, removing federal 
funding from institutions that discriminate against healthcare 
providers for not participating in abortions, see Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108–447, § 508, 118 
Stat. 2809, 3163 (2004); see also Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–161, § 508(d)(1), 121 Stat. 1844, 
2209.  
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new constitutional doctrine grounded in speculation 
about what constitutes a “substantial” burden on 
third parties.  But such judicial speculation is exactly 
what the Court has sought to avoid.  See Smith, 494 
U.S. at 890 (rejecting an approach “in which judges 
weigh the social importance of all laws against the 
centrality of all religious beliefs”).     
III. THE THIRD-PARTY HARM OF 
INSURANCE COVERAGE THAT IS 
NOT “SEAMLESS” FAILS AS A 
COMPELLING INTEREST.  
 The scholars calling for a ban on religious 
exemptions that accompany “substantial” third-party 
harms reason that “seamless coverage [of 
abortifacients and contraceptives in insurance] is 
essential to the validity of an accommodation under 
RFRA in this context.” See, e.g., Law Professor 
submission, Comment on the coverage of certain 
preventative services under the Affordable Care Act, 
(Oct. 21, 2014), at 4 (on file with author).26  In other 
words, no religious exemption may issue under 
RFRA if it results in “delays or excess costs for 
beneficiaries entitled to contraceptive coverage 
without cost sharing.”  Id. at 5.  But under RFRA, 
“seamless” coverage fails as a compelling interest.  
 By incorporating the assessment of third-party 
harms into RFRA’s compelling-interest prong, see 
                                                          
26 See also Gedicks & Van Tassel, supra note 3 at 374-79; Micah 
Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, The 
Establishment Clause and the Contraception Mandate, 
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2013), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-establishment-clause-
and.html.  
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Hobby Lobby,  134 S. Ct. at 2781 n. 37, the statute 
puts on the government the burden of showing that 
these harms meet the compelling-interest test.  That 
test “is satisfied through application of the 
challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular 
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being 
burdened.” Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 863.  As such, the 
Court will “‘scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of 
granting specific exemptions to particular religious 
claimants,’ and ‘look to the marginal interest in 
enforcing’ the challenged government action in that 
particular context.”  Id. (quoting Hobby Lobby, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2779 (quoting O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431)). 
 RFRA’s demanding standard follows from the 
fact that it “did more than merely restore the 
balancing test used in the Sherbert [v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398 (1963)] line of cases; it provided even 
broader protection for religious liberty than was 
available under those decisions.”  Hobby Lobby, 134 
S. Ct. at 2761 n.3.  As Professor Michael Stokes 
Paulsen observed, “the test is an extremely rigorous 
one, referring to an extremely narrow range of 
permissible justifications for infringements on 
religious liberty.  Not every legitimate, or even very 
important, interest of government qualifies.” 
Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It, 56 MONT. L. REV. 
at 263; cf. id. (“Only interests ‘of the highest order’ 
and ‘not otherwise served’ qualify, in the words of 
Yoder.  Sherbert’s words are even more strict: Only 
‘the gravest abuses, endangering paramount 
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation’ of 
religious exercise.’”) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 215  (1972), Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 42 
(emphasis added) (original quotation marks and 
citations omitted)).  
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 Even if the government possesses a compelling 
interest in providing contraceptive and abortifacient 
insurance coverage without cost-sharing, it has failed 
to meet its burden to show such an interest in 
“seamless” coverage.  Satisfying its burden requires 
the government to “specifically identify an actual 
problem in need of solving” and to show that 
burdening religious exercise “must be actually 
necessary to the solution.”  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. 
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted).  But the government cannot 
meet this burden.   
 There is a clear distinction between a right to 
engage in certain activity and a compelling interest 
in making cost-free access to that activity “seamless.”  
Just as there are limitations that the Constitution 
places on the harm to third parties in religious 
exemptions, there are limits that the Constitution 
places on abortion restrictions.  See Planned 
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-77 
(1992) (holding that a statute is unconstitutional 
when it places an “undue burden” on a woman, 
occurring when it has the “purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus”).  Lacking 
“seamless” access to abortion, however, is not such a 
burden. 
 By granting the RFRA exemption sought in 
this case, women working for the Little Sisters of the 
Poor would be left with “the same range of 
[insurance] choice[s] . . . as [they] would have had if 
Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care 
costs at all,” which the Court found acceptable in 
upholding the Hyde Amendment.  See Harris v. 
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McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315-17 (1980).  This holding is 
consistent with the effect of RFRA’s statutory 
incorporation into the Affordable Care Act.  As 
discussed above, RFRA ensures that the “baseline” of 
rights for the religious claimant and the third party 
remains the same as it was before the new 
governmental burden.  As explained in McRae, a 
woman’s constitutional right to abortion does not 
result in “a constitutional entitlement to the 
financial resources to avail herself of the full range of 
protected choices.”  Id. at 316.  The government is 
under no obligation to “remove those [obstacles to a 
right] not of its own creation.”  Id.   This distinction 
compliments the “baseline” distinction between 
religious preferences and religious exemptions drawn 
in Amos and supported by RFRA.  See Amos, 483 
U.S. at 337 n. 15 (“Undoubtedly, [the third party’s] 
freedom of choice in religious matters was impinged 
upon, but it was the Church . . . and not the 
Government who put him to the choice of changing 
his religious practices or losing his job. . . .”) 
(emphasis added).   
 To deny a religious exemption under RFRA, 
the third-party interest at stake must be an interest 
that “the law deems compelling.” Hobby Lobby, 134 
S. Ct. at 2786-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  But, “the 
government does not have a compelling interest in 
each marginal percentage point by which its goals 
are advanced.”  See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741 n. 9.  
There is thus no compelling interest in “seamless” 
insurance coverage.  As the analogy to McRae 
illustrates, the line between a third-party’s right and 
a compelling government interest in “seamless” 
access to that right, which is not compelling, is 
critical.   
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    Justice Kennedy pressed  the government on 
this issue during oral argument in Hobby Lobby. 
When asked if for-profit corporations faced the risk of 
being “forced in principle to pay for abortions” 
because they could not receive a religious exemption, 
the government stated that that outcome would 
“depend on the entity” seeking an exemption.   See 
Oral Arg. Tr. at 75:1-24, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (Mar. 25, 2014).  The 
government argued that while a for-profit 
corporation could be forced to pay for abortions, see 
id. at 75:19-24—a position the Court’s decision in 
Hobby Lobby puts in serious doubt—churches and 
religious nonprofits would never be exposed to that 
risk, see id. at 75:12-14 (“It certainly wouldn’t be 
true, I think, for religious nonprofits.  It certainly 
wouldn’t be true for a church.”).  But, in embracing a 
“third-party harms” trump to a RFRA exemption for 
religious nonprofits—while granting an exemption to 
churches and their integrated auxiliaries—the 
government has changed course.  It is now forcing 
religious nonprofits to provide “seamless” access of 
abortifacients and contraceptive coverage while 
exempting churches from the same obligation.  
 The Affordable Care Act and implementing 
regulations offer exemptions that add additional 
steps to securing insurance coverage—and thus deny 
“seamless” coverage—of abortifacients and 
contraceptives to tens of millions of Americans.  The 
law exempts any plan that was in existence before 
March 23, 2010 and did not make certain changes 
afterwards from complying with the abortifacient 
and contraceptive mandate.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18011.  
Indeed, this particular exemption is meant “simply 
[to serve] the interest of employers in avoiding the 
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inconvenience of amending an existing plan.”  Hobby 
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.   The statute itself also 
exempts all employers with less than fifty employees 
(employing approximately 34 million Americans)—
they are not required to provide insurance coverage 
at all.  See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A); Hobby Lobby, 
134 S. Ct. at 2764.  Most relevant to the Little 
Sisters of the Poor and other religious nonprofits 
here, HHS exempted churches and their integrated 
auxiliaries from complying with the mandate 
altogether as well.   See 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,870, 
39,874 (July 2, 2013); 45 C.F.R. 147.131(a).  In the 
case of these “religious employers,” their exemption 
hinges on how much control a church exerts over the 
organization.  See 26 C.F.R. 1.6033-2(h).   
 The government’s failure to give the Little 
Sisters of the Poor and other religious nonprofits the 
same exemption given to churches and their 
integrated auxiliaries undermines a compelling 
government interest in “seamless” coverage.   For a 
third-party harm in lacking “seamless” coverage to 
constitute a compelling interest, the government’s 
own underinclusiveness must not do “appreciable 
damage to [the] supposedly vital interest prohibited.”  
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) (quotation 
omitted).  Here, the government’s interest in 
“seamless” coverage is belied by the Affordable Care 
Act itself, which authorizes the same exemption 
sought here to tens of millions of Americans, 
including churches and their integrated auxiliaries.  
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (explaining that 
women who work for exempted organizations may 
seek insurance coverage on the government’s 
exchanges or buy it on their own, “requir[ing] 
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[women] to take steps to learn about, and to sign up 
for, a new government funded and administered 
health benefit.”).  The government takes the position 
that the Little Sisters of the Poor and other religious 
nonprofits already have a “choice” not to provide 
insurance coverage of abortifacients and 
contraceptives, and that should settle the matter.  
“But the fact that a choice was made according to 
interest does not exclude duress.  It is the 
characteristic of duress properly so called.”  Union 
P.R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n., 248 U.S. 67, 70 
(1918) (per Holmes, J.).  The government’s singling 
out of religious nonprofits for disparate treatment 
puts religious exercise at stake.  
 “RFRA is inconsistent with the insistence of 
an agency such as HHS on distinguishing between 
different religious believers—burdening one while 
accommodating the other—when it may treat both 
equally . . . .”  Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
Nevertheless, HHS continues to discriminate among 
religious organizations based on its own definition of 
what organization is “religious enough” to receive an 
exemption.  HHS provided an exemption from its 
contraceptive and abortifacient mandate to “houses 
of worship and their integrated auxiliaries”—but not 
to the Little Sisters of the Poor or other religious 
nonprofits—because employees of these 
organizations, according to HHS, “are more likely 
than other employers to employ people of the same 
faith,” and, in its view, “less likely” to employ people 
who desire contraceptives and abortifacients.  See 78 
Fed. Reg. at 39,874.  Tellingly, the scholars arguing 
against exempting religious nonprofits from the HHS 
abortifacient and contraceptive insurance mandate 
make an exception for churches and integrated 
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auxiliaries too.  See Gedicks & Van Tassell, RFRA 
Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate, 49 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at 380-81.  “But a woman 
working for a church suffers the same unrealized-
benefit ‘loss’ as does a woman working for” the Little 
Sisters of the Poor.  See Esbeck, Third-Party Harms, 
at 13.  Allowing the government to determine what 
entities are “religious enough” to garner religious 
exemptions undermines one of “the reasons the 
United States is so open, so tolerant, and so free[:] no 
person may be restricted or demeaned by 
government in exercising his or her religion.” Hobby 
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
Denying religious nonprofits the same treatment as 
churches—on the grounds that the Little Sisters of 
the Poor and other religious nonprofits are not 
“religious enough” to be worthy of the same 
exemption as churches—demeans the Little Sisters 
of the Poor and religious nonprofits.  See id. at 2785 
(“[F]ree exercise is essential in preserving their own 
dignity and in striving for a self-definition shaped by 
their religious precepts.”).  There cannot be a 
compelling interest in demeaning free exercise.  
CONCLUSION 
Because the government’s asserted interest in 
“seamless” coverage cannot satisfy the compelling-
interest standard under RFRA, some scholars seek to 
circumvent this standard with a new constitutional 
doctrine focused on third-party harms.  But RFRA 
does exactly what is required in this “difficult” 
area—“reconcile [the] two priorities” of protecting 
third-party interests and protecting religious 
exercise, see id. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
Letting one of these priorities automatically trump 
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the other when it is “substantial” has no basis and 
invites judicial mishandling of this delicate harmony.  
This mishandling could force believers to violate 
deeply-held beliefs on matters that the Court 
understands to be of grave significance.  Amici 
respectfully ask the Court to reject this end-run 
around RFRA.  
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
Ryan A. Shores 
Counsel of Record 
William J. Haun 
Hunton & Williams LLP 
2200 Pennsylvania 
Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20037 
(202) 955-1500 
rshores@hunton.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF AMICI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1a 
 
John S. Baker, Jr., Ph.D. 
Professor Emeritus 
Louisiana State University Law Center 
 
Nathan S. Chapman 
Assistant Professor 
University of Georgia Law School 
 
Robert F. Cochran, Jr.  
Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law 
Director, Herbert and Elinor Nootbaar 
 Institute on Law, Religion, and Ethics 
Pepperdine University School of Law 
 
Ronald J. Colombo 
Associate Dean for Distance Education 
 Professor of Law 
Maurice A. Deane School of Law 
Hofstra University  
 
Marc O. DeGirolami 
Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship 
Professor of Law 
St. John’s University School of Law  
 
Robert A. Destro 
Professor of Law & Director 
Interdisciplinary Program in Law & Religion 
Columbus School of Law 
The Catholic University of America 
 
Tessa Dysart 
Assistant Professor of Law 
Regent University School of Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2a 
 
 
Richard A. Epstein 
Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law 
New York University Law School  
Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow 
Hoover Institution 
James Parker Hall Distinguished Service 
 Professor Emeritus of Law and Senior 
 Lecturer 
University of Chicago Law School  
 
Carl H. Esbeck 
R.B. Price Professor of Law emeritus 
University of Missouri 
 
David F. Forte 
Professor of Law 
Cleveland State University 
 
Richard Garnett 
Paul J. Schierl/Fort Howard Corporation 
 Professor 
Notre Dame Law School  
 
Robert P. George 
McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence 
Princeton University 
 
Antony Kolenc  
Associate Professor of Law 
Florida Coastal School of Law  
 
Stacy A. Scaldo 
Associate Professor of Law 
Florida Coastal School of Law 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3a 
 
David R. Upham 
Associate Professor of Politics 
University of Dallas 
 
Michael M. Uhlmann 
Clinical Professor of American Politics 
Claremont Graduate University 
